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Objective Quantitative Tracker Performance Analysis 
Renb A . Hogendoom, Bill H. L. Neven and Jan Westland' 
Summary 
This paper addresses some issues in obtaining objectiveperforn~ance measuresfor sulveillance tracking systems. 
The testing of the tracker that ispart of the ATC Radar Tracker and Server (ARTAS) system is taken as an example. 
The applied methods, however, are applicable to any surveillance tracking system. 
Introduction 
NLR is participating in the Eurocontrol ARTAS project, being responsible for the design, implementation and 
testing ofthe Tracker sub-system. The ARTAS tracker is based on Interacting Multiple-Model ( I W  filters [ref. 
[Z], [3]] with Probabilistic Data-Association (PDA), in case of non-resolution tracks, and Joint Probabilistic Data- 
Association (FDA), in case of resolution tracks. Track height is estimated, based on Seconday Surveillance Radar 
(SSR) mode-C, or, in the absence of SSR information, a sophisticated triangulation algorithm. It uses reversed-time 
Multiple-Hypothesis Tracking (MHT) for track initiation. Furthermore, the tracker assesses many radar environment 
parameters on-line, e.g. the systematic radar errors, radar accuracy, probability of detection c.q. radar coverage and 
false plot maps. 
This paper adresses the issues encountered while testing the ARTAS tracker against the formal specifications. 
The specification of the ARTAS tracker is contained in [ref. [I]]. The section on tracker performance requirements 
contains a detailed description of standard scenarios and the expected tracker performance under these 
circumstances. These requirements are based on results, obtained with the NLR JUMPDIF prototype tracker and 
using the prototype TRAQUME tracker analysis tool for statistical analyses. The TRAQUME tool is based on the 
tracker quality analysis methods described in [refs. [4], [5]], i.e. a statistical analysis of the error behaviour of the 
tracker as a response on a certain target manoeuvre. The, so-called, Mode-of-Flight (MOF) concept is used to define 
the target behaviour. 
Tracker Performance Assessment 
The ARTAS tracker performance requirements are based on a "black box" principle, i.e. the tracker is considered as 
a "black box". A11 tests to verify the requirements are performed by analysing the response of the "black box" on 
different input signals. A vely important point with this type of analysis is the proper classification of the tracker 
input data, i.e. what type of signal is input to the "black box". To that end, the, so called, "Mode Of Flight" concept 
is introduced. A Mode-Of-Flight corresponds to one element of a whole set of different manoeuvres that are 
executed by aircraft, i.e. across-trajectory (transversal) changes: uniform motion (UM), slow, typical and expedite 
left and right turns (Tv-Sc, Tv-Tc and Tv-Fc), along-trajectory (longitudinal) changes: uniform motion (UM), slow 
and typical accelerations/decelerations (Lt-Sc and Lt-Tc) and vertical changes: uniform motion (UM), slow and 
typical climbs/descents (Ve-Sc and Ve-Tc). With this Mode-Of-Flight concept, it is possible to unambiguously 
classify the input of a tracker. Given this classification, it is now possible to measure a "static" accuracy, i.e. the 
accuracy while remainmg in a single Mode-Of-Flight, but also the "dynamic" accuracy, i.e. the response of the 
tracker on a change in Mode-Of-Flight, e.g. from Uniform Motion (UM) to a typical turn (Tv-Tc). 
Based on the experience, gained by the use of TRAQUME, NLR developed the MTRAQ (Multi-Radar Tracker 
Quality Assessment) facility. MTRAQ distinguishes six levels of abstraction 
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Level 1, being the lowest level, where inspection of the complete state vector of single tracks is possible (as a 
function of time). 
Level 2, where single tracks are compared against the corresponding reference trajectory. This concerns track 
accuracy analysis, i.e. track state vector versus reference trajectory state vector, track detection analysis, e.g. 
track initiation delay and track termination delay, and track MOF analysis, i.e. comparison of the track MOF 
versus reference trajectory MOF. These analyses can be done as a function of time, but also as a function of 
time, conditioned on a certain event, e.g. MOF being constant (time in MOF) or being in a resolution situation 
(time in close approach). 
. Level 3, where RMS error statistics are computed for all tracksltrajectories in a certain class, i.e. these 
tracksltrajectories all satisfy a certain criterion 
Level 4, where the results from level 3 are compressed into a set of abstract parameter values, e.g. RMS peak- 
error or RMS-convergence value of the course angle as a function of time in MOF, after a transition from 
uniform motion to a typical turn (UM to Tv-Tc) 
Level 5, where the parameters from level 4 are calculated as a function of the class, i.e. the criteria of which 
tracksltrajectories are varied. 
Level 6, where level 5 results are compared against an externally supplied reference, e.g. a theoretical result or 
the results from previous analyses with different tracker-parameter settings or the results from previous analyses 
with a different hacker. 
From each level, it is possible to navigate to the lower levels by selecting an element from the presented statistics, 
i.e. selecting a peak value at a certain time in level 3 will show a level 2 graph with all contributing tracks. In this 
way, it is possible to clarify unexpected behaviour with a minimum of effort by going to the successive lower layers 
and finding the offending track. 
Obviously, MTRAQ supports many ways of classifying tracksltrajectories, based on time, position, MOF, 
orientation w.r.t. a certain radar and so on. A tool, called GRACE, adds classification based on aeronautical 
information. With MTRAQ, it is assumed that all analyses are done interactively. This is acceptable for normal use: 
but for the large number of tests that need to be performed for the formal qualification of ARTAS, it is rather 
impractical and time-consuming, since large numbers of similar analyses have to he done. Therefore, the report 
generator ORGEM (Off-line Report Generator for MTRAQ) was developed. Using this tool, it is possible to 
perform large numbers of analyses automatically, resulting in reports, with an adaptable amount of detail, that 
indicate clearly where the test results deviate from their reference values. 
At present, the scenarios, that are used in the statistical analyses, are all simulated scenarios; the fmal goal, however, 
is to be able to use traffic of opportunity to analyse the track detection and track accuracy performances of 
surveillance trackers. 
Test Method 
The ARTAS tracker tests can be divided into several categories 
1. Functional tests, i.e. does the system process the specified inputs, does the system perform the functions that are 
specified and does the system provide the required output? 
2. Capacity tests, i.e. can the system handle the required input and output data rates, can the system handle the 
required number of input data sources and output data sinks, can the system handle the required maximum load 
and does the system provide the output data in time? 
3. Track detection analysis, i.e. track initiation, track drop, track swap and track deletion, SSR-code acquisition, 
SSR-code change event analyses. 
4. Track accuracy analysis, i.e. the comparison of the track state vector against a reference state vector. 
Here, categories 1 and 2 will not be considered, since they are conceptually straightforward. The approach, followed 
for categories 3 and 4, is to use the system, outlined in the introduction, to do a statistical analysis of the tracker 
results with several different scenarios. The scenarios are all described in the ARTAS specification [ref. [I]] and 
consist of mono-radar PR, SSR and mono-pulse SSR scenarios, with different revolutio~ times, mono-radar PR 
scenarios with low, medium and high false plot densities and multi-radar scenarios. In the latter case, the 
performance is specified in terms of an improvement over the mono-radar scenarios. The flights in the scenarios all 
contain a typical manoeuvre, e.g. a 0.6g turn, with a specific orientation to the radar, i.e. radial or tangential. These 
flights are repeated at different ranges and different azimuth values and at different time intervals to obtain a 
significant number of samples for the statistical analysis. 
Figure 1 shows the test environment as is used for the testing of the ARTAS hacker. It is based on the Eurocontrol 
RASS-C system, the MTRAQ system and the ORGEM facility. The scenarios are generated through the Simulator 
for Multi-Radar Analysis for Realistic Traffic (SMART) and stored on disk. They are replayed in real-time and the 
tracks are captured and recorded on disk. The Object Correlator is used to chain the plots and to make the hack-to- 
chain associations. In principle, the output of the Object Correlator suffices to do most of the track detection 
analysis, but the current MTRAQ also requires the presence of reconshucted hajectories. So, the next step to be 
performed after the Object Correlator is to use the Multi-Radar Trajectory Reconstruction 11 (Muratrec-11) tool to 
obtain reference hajectories. Apart from the reference state vectors, Muratrec-I1 also calculates the horizontal and 
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Figure 1: The Tracker Test Environment 
Results 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show ARTAS hacker results, obtained with MTRAQ, testing the "static" groundspeed RMS 
emor after convergence. The scenario contains straight flights (UM), that are initiated, so what is shown is the 
groundspeed convergence behaviour right after hack initiation. Figure 2 shows the results of each individual hack 
and Figure 3 shows the averaged statistic. From this averaged statistic, the RMS convergence value is determined 
(in this case, about 1.6 rnls), which is well below the required figure (2.05 mls). 
The results for hack detection analysis are less satisfactoly. First of all, the hack detection analysis statistics suffer 
from outlier measurements, that, with the present MTRAQ, cannot he properly handled. A separate track detection 
analysis program is now being designed by NLR, in co-operation with Eurocontrol, that allows a direct adaptation of 
the input data filtering with a corresponding update of the analysis results. This allows e.g. an easy weeding of 
outlier results. A second problem was that, in a number of cases, the reference was no better than the result of the 
tracker, which obviously led to statistics that are doubtful. Furthermore, it appeared that reconstruction of mono- 
radar PR trajectories was not possible. The latter problem was recently solved by providing SMART referencf 
trajectory data to MlXAQ, bypassing the reconstruction by Muratrec-11. 
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Figure 2: MTRAQ Level 2 Accuracy Analysis Result 
MTRAQ Level 3: Groundspeed RMS Error 
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Figure 3: MTRAQ Level 3 Accuracy Analysis Result 
Conclusions 
The objective analysis of tracker accuracy is feasible, as is demonstrated above. Track detection analysis is, with the 
present system, not yet feasible. However, based on the experience gained with MlXAQ, a new track detection 
analysis tool is being developed, that should bypass the identified limitations of MTRAQ. When this tool is 
available, objective hack detection analysis should be possible. Finally, future work should consider quality 
measures for the hacker input data, such that results can be extrapolated to different radar environments. This is a 
necessary step to be able to analyse the performance of surveillance trackers on-line, i.e. on haffic of opportunity. 
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